NBACC is to contain four separate centers, buildings for each of which are being built adjacent to the US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID). One of the four centers, the Biothreat Characterization Center, according to Dr. Korch's slides, will carry out studies in some sixteen different subject areas, among which will be these:
• genetic engineering;
• susceptibility to current therapeutics;
• host-range studies;
• environmental stability;
• aerosol animal-model development;
• aerosol dynamics;
• novel packaging;
• novel delivery of threat;
• bioregulators and immunomodulators; and
• "Red Teaming," which is to say duplication of threat scenarios.
Task areas for biothreat-agent (BTA) analysis and technical-threat assessment were summarized as "Acquire, Grow, Modify, Store, Stabilize, Package, Disperse." Classical, emerging, and genetically engineered pathogens are to be characterized for their BTA potential.
Aerobiology, aerosol physics, and environmental stability will be studied in wet-laboratory and computer-laboratory settings. "Computational modeling of feasibility, methods, and scale of production" will be undertaken, and "Red Team" operational scenarios and capabilities will be assessed. BTA use and countermeasure effectiveness will be studied "across the spectrum of potential attack scenarios" through "[h]igh-fidelity modeling and simulation." And so forth. 3 The rapidity of elaboration of American biodefense programs, their ambition and administrative aggressiveness, and the degree to which they push against the prohibitions of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), are startling.
The production and stockpiling of biological-weapons agents are not the only criteria by which an offensive biological weapons (BW) program is defined. They are only such a program's most obvious terminal expressions. Taken together, many of the activities detailed above -most particularly the "Store, Stabilize, Package, Disperse" sequence and the "Computational modeling of feasibility, methods, and scale of production" item -may constitute development in the guise of threat assessment, and they certainly will be interpreted 2 that way. Development is prohibited by the Biological Weapons Convention.
How would these activities differ from their counterparts in the pre-1969 US BW program except for production and stockpiling this time not being envisioned? 4 In recent remarks elsewhere, Dr. Korch noted that one NBACC objective, creation of genetically engineered agents, might raise BWC compliance questions. Yet other NBACC objectives could prove even more problematic.
On April 28, 2004, at the conclusion of a year's review, the Bush administration disclosed details of the new National Biodefense Directive. 5 Among them, reportedly, was that "the US intelligence community is under orders to carry out studies examining the types of genetically engineered 'bugs' terrorists could be working on to mount an attack." 6 Surely, the "intelligence community" is the least appropriate place in the US government to "carry out" such work -and the most likely to lack adequate oversight. And does a program of this design bear any relation to the realistic level of threat presented by non-state actor "bioterrorists"? 7 Recently declassified documents demonstrate that the US intelligence community possesses evidence demonstrating that interested terrorist groups -al Qaeda among them -still have no capability to work with classical BW agents and certainly cannot engineer agents genetically. 
